Stephen Minister, J. Aaron Simmons, and Michael Strawser, eds., KIERKEGAARD\u27S GOD AND THE GOOD LIFE by Helms, Eleanor
Faith and Philosophy508
need a reason to delay. Because this is part of my temperament, I find it 
hard to agree with Mawson and Sartre about the value of self-creative 
autonomy. Mawson writes that “Sartrean meaningfulness” is “a sense of 
meaningfulness that in and of itself we rightly value” (123). However, I do 
not regard self-creative autonomy as an intrinsic good. It seems to me to 
have no more than instrumental value. This is because what I ultimately 
value is perfect happiness, and I think of it as experiences of nothing but 
pleasure (disclosure: while I am not a hedonist, I am a hedonist about 
happiness). Thus, were I to be perfectly happy, I would not care the least 
about possessing self-creative autonomy or free will. I value having free 
will and, by implication, self-creative autonomy only to the extent that it 
provides me with good reason to think and hope that I might be able to 
do something to remove myself from a situation in life that is less than ap-
pealing. But perfect happiness could never be to any degree unappealing. 
Moreover, it is because I think of perfect happiness as the experience of 
nothing but pleasure that I am unpersuaded by the objection (standardly 
traced to Bernard Williams) that eternal bliss would become boring. How 
could the experience of pleasure be boring? Mawson also finds the “bore-
dom” objection wanting: “And surely worshipping God in the full glory 
of the beatific vision would not be boredom-worthy” (141). Absolutely so. 
But I believe it is the pleasurable nature of that vision that makes clear 
why it could not be boring.
It is because I part ways with Mawson (and Sartre) about the value of 
self-creative autonomy that I in the end part ways with his polyvalent 
amalgamist view that not all of the deeply valuable meanings of life are 
jointly satisfiable. I believe that not having meaning in the Sartrean sense 
in the heavenly end that is perfect happiness would not in any respect be 
bad for us. What would be bad for us is my failing to commend once again 
Mawson’s book. It is the gold standard among works on the meaning of life.
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Kierkegaard’s God and the Good Life presents recent work on love, faith, re-
sponsibility, and well-being in Kierkegaard. Several of the essays engage 
somewhat unusual topics in the context of Kierkegaardian ethics, includ-
ing early Christianity (Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria), Google, 




irony, and pentecostal philosophy. Several alternative accounts of love and 
responsibility (those of Simone Weil, Anders Nygren, Immanuel Levinas, 
and Dietrich von Hildebrand) are examined in detail and brought in to 
illuminate Kierkegaard’s work. The collection is a valuable contribution to 
scholarship on Kierkegaard’s ethics, and each essay is clear and engaging 
enough to serve as an introduction to Kierkegaard’s thought, including 
for advanced undergraduates. Some essays also offer close readings of 
important but lesser known works by Kierkegaard, especially For Self-
Examination and Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, in addition to new 
perspectives on Works of Love and Fear and Trembling.
The editors describe the collection as addressing some persistent mis-
understandings of Kierkegaard’s thought. His work is still considered 
by some to either (1) have nothing to say about ethical issues or (2) offer 
views of ethics and social life that are too individualistic or irrational. The 
editors describe the book as aimed at
overcoming any facile view of Kierkegaard as being either irrelevant regard-
ing such issues (due to the mistaken, but still widespread, interpretation of 
Kierkegaard as being an irrationalist fideist with no concern for social exis-
tence) or even dangerous for social life itself (due to the mistaken, but still 
occasionally found, view of Kierkegaard as being an immoralist). (x)
While this is a lot to take on, I think the collection makes strides in these 
directions and certainly puts forward readings that, far from “facile,” em-
brace complex and subtle understandings of our human responsibilities 
toward others. The essays demonstrate that Kierkegaard makes positive, 
perhaps even indispensable, contributions to ethical thought. Rather than 
challenging opponents or skeptics directly, the collection outpaces them 
by presenting interpretations that are philosophically rich and make good 
sense of Kierkegaard’s texts. The book’s constructive approach is effective: 
Why spend time challenging those who claim Kierkegaard has no ethics 
when there is so much Kierkegaardian ethics to talk about?
In addition to the two misunderstandings mentioned above, the edi-
tors also frame the book as addressing two specific areas in which the 
relationship between “moral action and thinking about God” has become, 
or has been perceived to have become, “deeply problematic” (ix). First, 
they describe a tendency in Kierkegaard scholarship to “downplay the 
orthodox religious aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought in order to make his 
philosophy more relevant to contemporary trends,” such as postmod-
ernism. Although they describe this kind of approach as a “current trend,” 
postmodern readings are not particularly new, and it would be hard to 
make the case that they are becoming more common. Louis Mackey’s in-
corporation of literary theory and Derrida’s philosophy in Kierkegaard: A 
Kind of Poet appeared in 1971, nearly half a century (forty-six years) be-
fore this collection. And while the postmodern approach has continued 
to have representatives since then (Roger Poole’s Kierkegaard: The Indirect 
Communication [1993], the anthology The New Kierkegaard [2004], and John 
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Caputo’s On Religion [2001, new edition this year] all come readily to 
mind), these voices in the wider scope of Kierkegaard scholarship, while 
influential, hardly constitute a trend. More recent starting points for read-
ing Kierkegaard include engaging with work in contemporary analytic 
philosophy (such as personal identity, immortality, epistemology, and 
aesthetics) as well as reconsidering traditional views of Kierkegaard’s re-
lationship to German Idealism. Given that one stated aim of the collection 
is to move beyond postmodern interpretations, it is counterproductive to 
treat postmodern interpretations to begin with as having so much clout. 
On the other hand, while neither new nor dominant, postmodern ap-
proaches are well worth engaging. The strongest, most sustained discus-
sion of a postmodern view in the collection is Strawser’s engagement with 
Mackey on love; Simmons also briefly discusses Caputo, though one of 
the more interesting critiques is buried in a footnote of his chapter. In any 
case, I hope new readers will not come away with the idea that the authors 
in this volume are an embattled minority rather the leading, trend-setting 
voices they in fact are. While many contemporary scholars do not treat 
Kierkegaard as a religious thinker, there have been and remain a good 
many that do. Rather than a solution to an emerging problem, I think the 
collection is better understood as a set of noteworthy and welcome ad-
ditions to a well-represented tradition. The book advances ideas from a 
similar collection edited by Mooney a decade ago (Ethics, Love, and Faith in 
Kierkegaard, 2008), with essays by some of the same authors (Davenport, 
Furtak, Piety, and Mooney) and offering in-depth discussions of other 
contributors to the earlier volume (Pattison, Roberts, and Ferreira).
The second point the editors describe as “increasingly prominent” is 
the “intersection between religious existence and social life,” including 
as it impacts political contexts (ix). The essays offer helpful foundations 
for addressing contemporary socio-political questions rather than direct 
applications to contemporary issues (with the exception of the essay on 
Google). The collection shows that Kierkegaard “offers profound re-
sources for contemporary existence, not despite his religious commit-
ments, but precisely because of them” (ix) and “offer[s] reasons to think 
that there are no simple answers when it comes to understanding Kierkeg-
aard’s complex, theologically oriented authorship and its ethical impact” 
(ix–x). The authors’ integration of Kierkegaard’s ethics into his thinking 
as a whole also demonstrates that “to think about Kierkegaard’s God re-
quires thinking seriously about what the good life is and should be” (xvii) 
and moreover asks readers to respond to a call to “engaged living” (xviii). 
The overall impression there is something (or many things) one ought to 
go out and do after reading Kierkegaard is part of the unusual energy and 
importance of the collection.
The book consists of three main parts. In the first part, “Faith and 
Love,” the essays examine the intersection of love, the good life, and their 
shared foundation in God. One distinguishing feature of this first group 
of essays is their in-depth engagement with other thinkers, including Leo 
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Tolstoy (Krishek), Anders Nygren (Søltoft and Davenport), Dietrich von 
Hildebrand (Davenport), and Simone Weil (Tietjen and Mooney). Sharon 
Krishek argues that Kierkegaard offers an explanation for the brief peace 
experienced by Tolstoy’s Ivan Ilych at the end of his life, left unexplained 
by Tolstoy. According to Kierkegaard, love is the highest achievement of 
a good life, and his own potential to love is what Ilyich finally realizes. 
Michael Strawser characterizes the activity of relating to others through 
love, rather than passively enjoying eternal happiness, as the highest good 
in Kierkegaard, arguing that “the good life on Earth must be our primary 
affirmation” (27). Pia Søltoft shows ways in which agapic neighbor love, as 
a kind of passion, need not be separated from erotic love, contra Nygren’s 
view. John Davenport addresses the same problem of preferential (or 
“special”) loves and love of neighbor, arguing (like Søltoft ) that erotic and 
agapic loves need not be opposed, suggesting instead that special loves 
can be “infused” with agapic love. Mark Tietjen takes on the provocative 
question of whether the good life requires Christian theism, concluding 
that Christianity offers a strong justification for the aim of equality. He 
argues for “agapic moral fideism,” which expects to find love in others we 
can never fully confirm.
Part 2, “Moral Psychology and Ethical Existence,” examines the rela-
tionship between faith and moral development. John Lippitt argues that 
the virtue of humility is not self-effacement but rather self-confidence that 
facilitates gratitude, as a disposition not to experience negative emotions 
related to competition. Lippitt articulates a complex network of virtues: 
humility and gratitude motivate contentment and joy and are expressed 
through hope and patience, which in turn communicate humility as trust 
in goodness beyond one’s own power and understanding. Rick Furtak’s 
essay reveals how affections and moods influence our perception of re-
ality, and in fact contribute to constituting that reality; a purely dispas-
sionate approach to knowledge would fail to understand the world as 
it really is. Furtak includes extended analogies to acknowledging one’s 
own mortality and recognizing the value of one who has died, noting 
that it can be difficult to appreciate the positive qualities of existence until 
they are lost or threatened. Christopher Barnett proposes a similarity be-
tween Google’s aim of making information accessible and Hegel’s system 
of knowledge, proposing contemplation (Betragtning) as an antidote to 
both. Lastly, Stephen Minister describes how Levinas seeks to reconcile 
his gratitude toward individual Christian who reached out to vulnerable 
Jews with the “coexistence of the rise of National Socialism and the Ho-
locaust with Christianity’s dominance in Europe” (153). Minister suggests 
that Kierkegaard, while having more to say about ethics than many think, 
is still subject to Levinas’s criticisms of him and of Christianity more gen-
erally. Namely, Levinas points out the troubling reality that individuals 
must often rely on the loving sacrifices of others when structural justice 
has failed them, and neither Kierkegaard nor Christianity place enough 
emphasis on structural justice.
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The essays of the third part, “Existence Before God,” offer more spe-
cific recommendations for living a good life and for further thinking 
about religion and philosophy (though again, not mainly by addressing 
contemporary issues directly). Edward Mooney affirms the importance 
of gratitude and thinks of faith as offering a kind of resilience, which he 
describes as an ability “to weather disruptions and to stay open to mar-
vels” (188). Mooney’s essay focuses on self-deception as the main obstacle 
to such resilience, offering a Kierkegaardian account of how and why it 
occurs. Marilyn G. Piety argues that knowledge is essential to love (refer-
encing Furtak as one of the few to recognize this) and provides an account 
of knowledge in Kierkegaard, describing faith as providing a “foundation 
for Christian knowledge, just as sensory experience provides the founda-
tion for empirical knowledge” (197). She emphasizes such knowledge is 
always embedded in concrete life and that living a good life cannot be 
separated from the quest for truth. Grant Julin undertakes an exploration 
of Job’s suffering, drawing attention to Job’s inner relation to himself (in 
contrast with his degree of correctness against God), which can similarly 
apply to how we understand ourselves before God. Finally, Aaron Sim-
mons contributes to both Kierkegaard studies and pentecostal philosophy, 
arguing that Kierkegaard’s philosophy is “understood productively in re-
lation to Pentecostalism” (xvii). Making use of guideposts for pentecostal 
philosophy provided by James K. A. Smith, and then examining William J. 
Seymour and Kierkegaard in this light, Simmons shows the importance of 
the Holy Spirit in Kierkegaard’s writings, where Christianity transforms 
the world by “breathing different air” (241), offering new ways of “inhab-
iting the world and relating to our neighbors within it” (243).
There are other interesting strains in the book that are not named as 
themes, including incorporations of phenomenology in the chapters by 
Søltoft , Strawser, and Furtak, and indirectly in Mooney’s discussion of 
self-deception (with a brief mention of Sartre). Emphasizing Kierkegaard’s 
roots in phenomenology (e.g., Hegelianism) and similarities with twenti-
eth-century phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Furtak) 
offers a promising alternative to postmodern interpretations (as I have 
also argued) by showing how Kierkegaard reveals universal structures of 
experience. Another unmarked strain is the reappearance in different es-
says of the parable of the lilies of the field and the birds of the air as retold 
in Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (in chapters by Tietjen, Lippitt, 
and Barnett, the latter two referencing George Pattison). The recurrence 
suggests there is something timely and perhaps yet unresolved in this set 
of parables as retold by Kierkegaard, and I hope they will be taken up by 
yet more readers and scholars.
I also hope someone will take up and respond to Minister’s Levinasian 
challenge to Kierkegaard (and Christianity in general) which, while care-
fully qualified, goes more or less unanswered by any essay in the vol-
ume. One observation I do have about the Levinasian challenge (namely, 
that Kierkegaard pays little attention to political justice, but that ethics 
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does require this wider concern), is that Minister’s critique of Kierkegaard 
draws mainly on Practice in Christianity, where it is likely that Kierkegaard 
presents an exaggerated fictional viewpoint more extreme than his own. 
(Pattison has described its pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, as a “hyper-
Christian”  in George Pattison, “Philosophy and Dogma: The Testimony 
of an Upbuilding Discourse,” in Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard, ed. 
Edward F. Mooney [Indiana University Press, 2008], 155–162.) Through-
out his essay, Minister attributes the quotations to Kierkegaard (rather 
than the character Anti-Climacus), which is unusual. The issue of citing 
pseudonyms is especially relevant in the context of engaging with post-
modernism, since Poole faulted “blunt” theological readings for neglect-
ing to read with literary sensitivity, and in particular for failing to be 
mindful of differences among pseudonyms. (Roger Poole, “‘My Wish, My 
Prayer’: Keeping the Pseudonyms Apart,” in Kierkegaard Revisited: Proceed-
ings from the Conference ‘The Meaning of Meaning It,’ edited by Niels Jorgen 
Cappelorn and Jon Stewart [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997], 156–176, and 
Kierkegaard: The Indirect Communication [Charlottesville: University Press 
of Virginia, 1993].) While Minister appeals to the example of the char-
woman from Works of Love to confirm that a passive approach to structural 
justice and material well-being is found throughout Kierkegaard’s work, I 
doubt as strong a case could be made against Kierkegaard if the “hyper” 
claims by Anti-Climacus are read as made by a fictional character, like 
Ivan’s speeches in The Brothers Karamazov or Ivan Ilych’s point of view in 
Tolstoy’s short story. I think adding more textual subtlety here would in 
the end support Minister’s project of making political justice more central 
to ethics: it could mean Kierkegaard agrees with Levinas on the impor-
tance of social goodness (and not just inner goodness) even more than is 
usually thought. On the other hand, it may just be that Kierkegaard (and 
Christianity) are ethically weaker here than Levinas (and Judaism). If so, 
is this merely a difference in emphasis, or is a neglect of material condi-
tions essential to Kierkegaard’s thought and perhaps to Christianity more 
broadly? How would this challenge affect our understanding of other 
essays in the volume?
These are hard questions, revealing some healthy disagreement among 
contributors. It would be difficult to dismiss the essays in this collection as 
the “blunt” theological readings criticized by Poole. Overall, the authors 
embrace tension and difficulty with courage and hope. In the care taken 
with the ideas of others, in the concern to make love and justice more 
central to our understanding of Kierkegaard and Christian ethics, and in 
the goal of offering new positive directions for religious thinking, the col-
lection is both effective and admirable. Each essay merits and rewards 
careful attention, and the volume as a whole is a valuable resource for 
examining the roles of love and faith in the quest for a good life.
